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A. General Questions 
 
Question 1 
From a UK perspective, a major challenge posed by the Banking Union is to reconcile the 
UK’s interests as an EU Member State and a major financial centre with the fact that the 
UK is not (and does not intend to be) part of the Banking Union. Thus, it is common in 
the UK to associate closer integration within the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
with potential threats to the integrity of the internal market, the latter being seen as the 
single most important EU asset – the ‘essential foundation’ of the European Union 
according to Prime Minister Cameron
1
 – for the UK. More specifically, from a UK point 
of view, the fear is that the activities within the Eurozone/Banking Union might come to 
impede access to the internal market for UK-based firms or otherwise disrupt the 
functioning of the internal market.  
Concerns over the integrity and unity of the internal market were associated with the idea 
of a genuine EMU (which the Banking Union is part of) right from the beginning.
2
 
Provisions underlining the importance of ensuring the integrity and unity of the internal 
market are found in various legislative acts which underpin the Banking Union: for 
instance in Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013 (the ‘SSM Regulation’) or in 
Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014 (the ‘SRM Regulation’).3  
Admittedly, the reality of these concerns remains to be established. However, the 
perception that the integrity of the internal market might be at threat was reinforced by 
the attempt of the ECB to implement its location policy for Central Counterparties 
(CCPs). The ECB’s location policy required CCPs which clear significant amounts of 
euro-denominated products to be located in the Eurozone area.
4
 For the ECB, the 
objective of this policy, which incidentally had been left unimplemented for a number of 
years, was legitimate. A failing CCP is potentially a risk to financial stability. From the 
ECB’s standpoint, control over CCPs which clear sizeable amounts of Euro euro-
                                                 
*
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1
 David Cameron’s Bloomberg speech is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-speech-
at-bloomberg/. 
2
 See e.g. European Council Conclusions 28/29 June 2012; European Council Conclusions 18/19 October 
2012, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/. 
3
 See Article 1 of Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on 
the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions 
[2013] OJ L 287/63. See also Article 6 of Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of 
credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a SRM and a SRF and amending 
Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 [2014] OJ L225/1. 
4
 E.g. European Central Bank, ‘Eurosystem oversight policy framework’ (July 2011) 10 
http://www.ecb.eu/pub/pdf/other/eurosystemoversightpolicyframework2011en.pdf.   
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denominated transactions, should therefore be located within the Eurozone area. For the 
UK however, the policy was a major concern. Specifically, the UK was concerned about 
the impact of the location policy on UK-based clearing houses such as LCH.Clearnet 
which has a vast portfolio of euro-denominated business.
5
 Unsurprisingly, the UK sought 
to challenge the policy before the Court of Justice of the European Union (the ‘Court’). 
The latter decided in favour of the UK last year.
6
  
Related to concerns over the internal market are the UK’s concerns that closer 
integration, including in the form of the Banking Union, might cause the UK to lose clout 
within the EU. More specifically, the fear is that closer integration within the Banking 
Union or EMU generally might come to affect the preferences and interests of Member 
States which participate in closer integration and which may as a result have incentives to 
coordinate their positions and vote increasingly as a bloc. Such behaviour could have a 
significant impact on the influence that the UK can exert. Concerns over a potential 
marginalisation of the UK were inter alia highlighted by the Foreign Affairs Committee 
of the House of Commons in its enquiry on the Future of the European Union: 
 
‘The Government has been concerned above all about the risk that further integration in 
the Eurozone might “spill over” into the Single Market and jeopardise the UK’s ability to 
participate meaningfully in Single Market decision-making.’7 
 
Similar concerns were voiced in the context of the Balance of Competences Review in 
the financial services area.
8
 It is also this sort of thinking which explains some of the key 
changes to Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 (the ‘EBA Regulation’).9 Specifically, for the 
UK, the fact that a majority of the voting members in the European Banking Authority 
(EBA) originate from Member States which are part of the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) meant that its interests in EBA were at risk. The resultant asymmetry 
between Member States which participate in the SSM and those that do not demanded 
therefore substantial changes to EBA’s voting arrangements, a view which was ultimately 
accepted by the EU legislature. The latter agreed inter alia to change EBA’s voting 
requirements and to add a new consensus principle to the EBA Regulation.
10
    
 
                                                 
5
 A Barker, G Parker and J Grant, ‘Britain to sue ECB over threat to City’ (Financial Times, 14 September 
2011). 
6
 Case T-496/11 United Kingdom v. European Central Bank, ECLI:EU:T:2015:133. 
7
 House of Commons (Foreign Affairs Committee), The Future of the European Union: UK Government 
Policy (First Report of Session 2013-14, Volume I), 41, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmfaff/87/87.pdf.  
8
 HM Government, Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the European 
Union - The Single Market: Financial Services and the Free Movement of Capital, (Summer 2014) 108, 
available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/332874/2902400_BoC_Free
domOfCapital_acc.pdf.  
9
 Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No. 
716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC [2010] OJ L331/12, as amended. 
10
 See for details, P Schammo ‘Differentiated Integration and the Single Supervisory Mechanism: which 
way forward for the European Banking Authority?’ in A Biondi and P Birkinshaw (eds) Britain Alone! The 
Implications and Consequences of UK Exit from the EU (Wolters Kluwer 2016). 
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Question 2 
The Banking Union is based on EU secondary law, which is itself based on the Treaties. 
As far as the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) is concerned (which is part of the SRM), it is 
also based on an international agreement (Agreement on the Transfer and Mutualisation 
of Contributions to the Single Resolution Fund).
11
 The Single Rulebook, which 
represents the substantive law in the banking field, is based on typical internal market 
legal bases (Article 53 or Article 114 TFEU). The main issues regarding legal bases arise 
in relation to the institutional aspects of the Banking Union.  
Given that amending the Treaties in order to accommodate the establishment of a 
Banking Union was not considered politically feasible, it was necessary to design the 
Banking Union’s arrangements with Treaty limitations and Court case law in mind (e.g. 
on Article 114 TFEU or on a delegation to outside bodies).  
The SSM Regulation is based on Article 127(6) TFEU which allows the Council to 
confer ‘specific tasks’ on the ECB relating to prudential supervision of credit institutions 
and other financial institutions, but not insurance undertakings. The adequacy of the legal 
basis has been much discussed. It is plain that the SSM Regulation was drafted in a way 
which is meant to ensure – formally at least – that the SSM squares with Article 127(6) 
TFEU and other Treaty provisions governing the ECB (for instance, regarding the 
governance of the ECB).  
The Single Resolution Board (SRB) was set up under Article 114 TFEU. It followed that 
the limitations traced by the Court on establishing agencies and entrusting them with 
powers had accordingly to be respected by the EU legislature.
12
 The issue was not new to 
the EU legislature. When it established the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), 
similar questions over how to square a transfer of powers with the Court’s case law were 
raised. As in the case of the ESAs, the EU legislature put in place arrangements to 
overcome these problems (see e.g., Article 18 SRM Regulation).  
All in all, it is plain that the fact that the Treaties could not be amended led to the 
adoption of some ungainly arrangements and required some ‘creative lawyering’. The 
fact that the shape and content of the SSM and SRM were driven by Treaty limitations 
was clearly not desirable. Moreover, the risk of judicial challenges remains a concern: for 
example with respect to the procedures set out in the SRM Regulation (see Article 18(7)) 
if they are seen as depriving the ‘delegator’ of a real power of appreciation.13 Hence, 
arguably legal certainty remains an issue, although if one can take the Court’s decision in 
the short selling case
14
 as an indication of the Court’s general mood with regard to 
Meroni, the Court is unlikely to be too hard-nosed.  
 
Question 4 
Undoubtedly, the establishment of the Banking Union, as part of a genuine EMU, had an 
impact on the way in which we conceive of the EU, its underlying constitutional 
principles, as well as relational aspects between EU institutions and with Member States.  
                                                 
11
 The agreement, signed in May 2014 is available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%208457%202014%20INIT. 
12
 See especially, Case C-270/12 United Kingdom v. European Parliament and Council, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:18; Case 9/56 Meroni v High Authority [1957-1958] ECR 133. 
13
 See in this context, Case 9/56 Meroni (n 12).  
14
 Case C-270/12 United Kingdom v. European Parliament and Council (n 12).  
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As noted above, the shape and content of the Banking Union testify to the EU’s inability 
to make salient Treaty changes. In order to accommodate specific legal bases (and higher 
up, principles such as conferral), the Banking Union required some ‘creative lawyering’, 
even if, admittedly, creative lawyering has always been part and parcel of the EU.  
More generally, the Banking Union testifies to the fact that the equilibrium between the 
EU and Member States in the field of supervision and enforcement in the banking field 
has shifted for good. Supervision of, and enforcement against, market actors, hitherto 
mostly left to national actors in the banking field, has moved centre-stage at Union 
(Eurozone) level. They are now tools of the ECB. Admittedly, this trend was already 
perceptible with the establishment of the European System of Financial Supervision. The 
European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) were given powers to address binding 
decisions to national competent authorities as well as market actors in certain 
circumstances. But there were clear restrictions, including in terms of the powers of the 
ESAs to address individual decisions to market actors: e.g. the need for directly 
applicable EU requirements. Moreover, save for the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA), the ESAs were not vested with day-to-day supervisory powers over 
market actors. Even ESMA was only given day-to-day supervisory powers in a couple of 
fields (in relation to Credit Rating Agencies and Trade Repositories). The establishment 
of the Banking Union marked a qualitative leap in this regard. Moreover, in its role as 
prudential supervisor, the ECB is empowered to apply national law implementing 
directives, including any national law giving effect to options granted to Member States 
in regulations. This is something clearly beyond the reach of the ESAs or other EU 
bodies for that matter. Thus, the transfer of supervisory and enforcement powers to Union 
level has had important implications for the institutional landscape at Union level and 
redefined the relationship between the Union, its institutions and Member States in the 
banking field. 
Besides enforcement and supervision, the establishment of the Banking Union also 
underscores the willingness of European/Eurozone leaders to overcome the EU’s 
traditional limitations in terms of spending power (a core attribute of how we conceive of 
the so-called ‘regulatory state’, according to Majone). 15  Prior to the financial and 
sovereign bank crises, financial support in case of bank failures was mainly a national 
matter. This in turn supported, prior to the decision to establish a Banking Union, the 
argument for keeping supervision at Member State level. The argument was made early 
on by former Chancellor of the Exchequer, Alistair Darling, in discussions over the future 
of European financial supervision. According to him: 
 
‘[s]upervisory and crisis-management arrangements need to be consistent and 
aligned. Responsibility for managing the resolution of financial crises - including 
fiscal support - remains an important consideration in designing supervisory and 
regulatory structures. Supervisory authority needs to be aligned with fiscal 
responsibility and this will be a very significant factor in limiting the extent to 
                                                 
15
 E.g. G Majone, ‘From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and Consequences of Changes in the 
Mode of Governance’ (1997) 17 Journal of Public Policy 139-167. 
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which national supervisors can devolve responsibility for the supervision of firms 
to a centralised body.’16 (emphasis added) 
 
However, the banking and sovereign debt crises also brought the need for substantial 
collective spending powers into sharp relief: see in this context the establishment of the 
European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility 
and subsequently the permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) for the Eurozone 
financed by Eurozone Member States; see also the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) which 
is part of the SRM and which is fed by bank contributions and will ultimately see a 
mutualisation of these contributions. The ESM now also offers a ‘last resort’ direct 
recapitalisation instrument (which is part of the funding arrangements of the SRM and 
which can be activated under admittedly restrictive conditions). These arrangements 
increase the ‘fire power’ of the Eurozone and help to overcome the EU’s spending 
limitations. They also testify to the willingness of European/Eurozone leaders to lift 
issues out of the confines of the Treaties, including its decision-making procedures, if 
politically expedient: see the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism and 
the Agreement on the Transfer and Mutualisation of Contributions to the Single 
Resolution Fund.
17
  
That said, the ‘fiscal responsibility’ issue continues to matter both within and outside the 
Banking Union, even if in different ways: see e.g. Article 38 of the EBA Regulation; or 
Article 6(6) and Recital (19) of the SRM Regulation.  
 
Question 5 
The Banking Union is closely linked to the idea of a level playing field. The 
establishment of the Banking Union was inter alia meant to address the problem of 
‘national bias’ of competent authorities towards so-called ‘national champions’. 
However, it is plain that the very existence of the Banking Union also creates fractures: 
most obviously between those Member States that are part of the Banking Union and 
those that do not intend to join. A number of provisions were added to various legislative 
texts in order to underpin the importance of ensuring equal treatment between market 
actors
18
 – a principle which benefits from constitutional recognition – but also to prevent 
discrimination between Member States as locations for financial or banking services. 
Thus, Article 1 of the SSM Regulation states that “[n]o action, proposal or policy of the 
ECB shall, directly or indirectly, discriminate against any Member State or group of 
Member States as a venue for the provision of banking or financial services in any 
currency”.19 Provisions seeking to prevent discrimination were also included in the SRM 
Regulation.
20
  
                                                 
16
 Letter of A Darling to the Czech Presidency ‘European Financial Regulation and Supervision’ (3 March 
2009), cited in P Schammo ‘EU Day-to-Day Supervision or Intervention-Based Supervision: Which Way 
Forward for the European System of Financial Supervision?’ (2012) 32 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
771-797. 
17
 The ESM Treaty is available at http://www.esm.europa.eu/about/legal-documents/ESM%20Treaty.htm. 
See n (11) for the Agreement on the Transfer and Mutualisation of Contributions to the SRF. 
18
 See e.g. Article 1 SSM Regulation, Article 6(1) SRM Regulation. 
19
 See also the duty of care of the same article. 
20
 See Article 6(1) SRM Regulation. 
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The equality concern must be seen in light of the UK’s concerns over closer integration 
within the Eurozone and the ECB’s attempt to implement its location policy (see above 
Question 1). In 2011, the UK had already attempted to obtain certain safeguards, in return 
for agreeing to Treaty changes which would have buttressed fiscal coordination among 
Eurozone countries. Specifically, it had (inter alia) asked for:  
 
‘[a]n explicit legal safeguard entrenching the principle of non-discrimination 
within the single market and, in particular, making it clear that there cannot be 
discrimination on grounds of the Member State in which a firm is located. This 
was to put beyond doubt the fact that seeking to force financial services 
businesses operating in a non euro area Member State to physically relocate to the 
euro area contravenes the Treaty’.21 
 
The UK’s attempt at securing safeguards at the 2011 European Council failed and led to 
the Fiscal Compact being adopted as an intergovernmental treaty. Unsurprisingly, the 
adoption of Article 1 of the SSM Regulation in 2013 – that is, the non-discrimination 
requirement of Article 1 – was hailed in the UK as a ‘significant achievement’ which 
‘guard[ed] against any restriction of the UK’s role as a financial centre in the Single 
Market’.22 However, an equality principle, which is meant to guard against discrimination 
against a Member State as a financial centre, remains a very general provision and thus 
subject to the whims of the Court. A ‘double-majority’ requirement such as the one found 
in the EBA Regulation is more effective in terms of protecting the interests of ‘outs’, but 
such a requirement might ultimately also be at the expense of the functioning of the 
EBA.
23
   
Equality is however not merely an issue as far as the relation between ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ is 
concerned. It affects the relationship between euro Member States and non-euro Member 
States that decide to join the SSM. A most obvious example is the governance structure 
of the ECB in its role as prudential supervisor. Non-euro Member States which 
participate in the SSM have no say in the ECB’s Governing Council, the ultimate 
decision-maker within the ECB. The issue is somewhat addressed by the establishment of 
the Supervisory Board as an internal organ for preparing the decisions of the Governing 
Council. Ultimately, however, it is clear that true equality of say presupposes that the 
Treaties be amended.  
 
Question 7 
The relationship between the Banking Union and the internal market was addressed 
above. The Banking Union is an example of differentiated integration. Actions taken by 
actors within the Banking Union might, as a side effect, disrupt the internal market. In the 
case of the ECB, this might be because of action taken in the micro-prudential field or in 
                                                 
21
 Letter from George Osborne to the Chairman of the Treasury Committee, Draft UK Requests on 
Financial Services at the December 2011 European Council, (February 2012), available at 
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/treasury/120228-LetterfromChxtoChair.pdf.  
22
 House of Commons (Foreign Affairs Committee), The future of the European Union: UK Government 
policy (First Report of Session 2013-14, Volume I) 46 (citing evidence given by the Financial Secretary to 
the Treasury).  
23
 See Schammo ‘Differentiated Integration and the Single Supervisory Mechanism’ (n 10) above. 
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the macro-prudential field. In the latter field, the ECB has limited powers, but they are 
nevertheless significant.  
However, it is important to bear in mind that before the establishment of the Banking 
Union, there were already examples where actions of national authorities – for instance, 
so-called ‘ring fencing’ measures – caused internal market disruption. Thus, the 
Commission reported that: 
 
‘[…] some banking supervisors introduced measures with ‘ring-fencing’ effects 
between 2008 and 2013, mostly in response to the economic and financial crisis, 
in order to keep bank assets within national borders or to pre-emptively strengthen 
the liquidity position of local banks. The main areas concerned were institution-
specific quantitative requirements under the supervisory review and evaluation 
process, the large exposures regime and domestic liquidity frameworks’.24 
 
The issue of internal market disruption is hence not one that is unique to the Banking 
Union, even if it is commonly associated – at least in the UK – with attempts at closer 
integration by the Eurozone. Moreover, safeguards were put in place in order to address 
potential issues.
25
 It is also reasonable to assume that EU actors are better at safeguarding 
a European interest than national authorities whose fate is closely intertwined with 
national interests. That said, given the geographical scope of the Banking Union, the 
scale of any potential issue is likely to be more significant. 
  
Question 13 
The UK is not part of the Banking Union. Measures which require implementation in the 
UK are those which (assuming that they require transposition (directives)) are considered 
to be part of the so-called Single Rulebook which underpins the Banking Union, but 
which extends to all Member States. It includes capital requirements legislation, 
resolution and recovery legislation as well as legislation on deposit guarantee schemes.  
 
Question 13a 
Transposition is typically done through a mixture of measures, including primary 
legislation (including amendments to primary legislation), subordinate legislation and 
rules which are made by the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct 
Authority.  
 
Question 13b 
The UK is not part of the Banking Union. From a UK law perspective, any problems are 
therefore likely to have the Single Rulebook as origin. In particular, UK concerns tend to 
focus on the issue of striking – from the UK’s standpoint – a proper balance between (i) 
the EU’s preference for uniformity (maximum harmonisation, use of regulations; no 
options; no derogations) which post-crisis is considered increasingly desirable, and (ii) a 
not uncommon preference in the UK for flexibility and discretion at the level of domestic 
                                                 
24
 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document on the movement of capital and the 
freedom of payments, SWD(2015) 58 final, 5 March 2015, p. 27. 
25
 E.g. the principle of non-discrimination and the duty of care in Article 1 of the SSM Regulation; see also 
Article 6 of the SRM Regulation. 
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law. There have been a number of major upsets for the UK in recent years: for example in 
relation to capital requirements legislation and the new rules on banker bonuses which 
the UK considers to be counter-productive. The latter point was recently re-iterated by 
the Bank of England. Referring to the new rules on banker bonuses in the CRD IV,
26
 the 
Bank of England noted:  
 
‘[…] this measure could have undesirable side-effects for financial stability if it 
limits the scope for remuneration to be clawed back. In particular, it is likely to 
make it harder for banks to adjust variable remuneration to reflect the financial 
health of the individual bank, and could limit the use of deferral arrangements that 
can better align remuneration with the long-term interests of the bank. Since the 
introduction of the bonus cap, there has been a marked increase in the proportion 
of fixed remuneration as a percentage of total pay for staff defined as material risk 
takers in the major UK banks, from 28% in 2013 to 54% in 2014; overall 
remuneration has risen only slightly’.27 
 
The UK challenged the CRD IV rules on compensation before the Court. However, 
following the release of the Advocate General’s opinion in November 2014,28 which 
proposed to reject the UK’s pleas, the UK government decided to drop the action before 
the Court.  
 
B. The Single Supervisory Mechanism 
 
Question 16a 
Within the SSM, the ECB is in charge of overseeing the functioning of the SSM and 
assumes exclusive competence for the authorisation of credit institutions based in a 
participating Member State, for the withdrawal of authorisation, and for the assessment of 
notifications regarding the acquisition and disposal of qualifying holdings.
29
 It also 
assumes direct (micro-prudential) supervisory competence within the SSM. However, the 
ECB does not directly supervise all credit institutions. Rather the distribution of 
supervisory responsibility is based on the ‘significance’ of supervised entities.30 The ECB 
has direct supervisory competence over significant supervised entities, while authority to 
supervise less significant supervised entities remains at national level (even though the 
ECB can under certain conditions decide to assume direct supervision
31
).  
                                                 
26
 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the 
activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, 
amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC [2013] OJ 
L176/338. 
27
 Bank of England, ‘EU membership and the Bank of England’ (October 2015) 80 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2015/euboe211015.pdf. 
28
 AG Opinion in Case C-507/13 United Kingdom v Parliament and Council, 20 November 2014, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2394. 
29
 Article 4(1)(a) and (c), and Article 6(4) SSM Regulation. 
30
 Article 6(4) SSM Regulation. For details, see Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central 
Bank of 16 April 2014 establishing the framework for cooperation with the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
between the European Central Bank and national competent authorities and with national designated 
authorities (SSM Framework Regulation) [2014] OJ L141/1. 
31
 Article 6(5)(b) SSM Regulation.  
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It is plain that the whole construct in the micro-prudential field rests critically on the 
definition of ‘significance’. The latter is specified in the SSM Regulation – in an 
especially tortuous Article 6(4) – and in the SSM Framework Regulation. 32 These rules 
are clearly complex and would have been much less so had the ECB been given direct 
supervisory competence over all supervised entities. The existence of quantitative and 
qualitative criteria is likely to give rise to differences of appreciation, which ultimately 
might lead to judicial challenges before the Court. Rules such as the ‘particular 
circumstances’ rule, which allows the ECB to treat a supervised entity as less significant 
even though it would ordinarily be considered ‘significant’, are especially open-ended.33 
Unsurprisingly, the choice in favour of a differentiated model of supervision based on 
such criteria creates litigation risks. The point is not just academic. A challenge has 
already been brought by Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg before the General Court 
against the decision of the ECB to treat it as a ‘significant’ entity.34  
See also (b) below on macro-prudential competence.  
 
Question 16b 
The dividing line between the ECB’s competences (under the SSM) and those of Member 
State authorities are to some extent artificial.
35
 It remains to be seen whether this 
separation will prove problematic in practice, but it is plain that close cooperation 
between the ECB and Member State authorities will be critical in order to ensure a proper 
oversight framework.
36
 
However, even for matters that are covered by the SSM, there are arguably complexities 
in terms of competences: e.g. in terms of macro- and micro-prudential supervision. While 
the ECB benefits from direct supervisory authority and SSM-wide authority in the micro-
prudential field, national authorities remain the primary holders of authority in the macro-
prudential field. The ECB’s powers in the macro-prudential field are said to be 
asymmetrical since it can only apply more stringent macro-prudential tools if it deems it 
necessary. Moreover, the level of harmonisation is also limited because some instruments 
have purely a national origin and are therefore out of the reach of the already limited 
powers of the ECB. While the SSM Regulation deals with macro- and micro-prudential 
tasks separately, there are nevertheless important interconnections (e.g. in terms of data 
collection) and overlaps in these fields. Specifically, the macro- and micro-prudential 
toolkits overlap: some tools can be used both for micro-prudential and for macro-
prudential purposes.
37
 Matters are further complicated by the lack of experience with 
macro-prudential tools. While there are valid arguments for leaving macro-prudential 
policy measures in the hands of national actors (since economic and financial cycles are 
                                                 
32
 See (n 30).  
33
 Article 6(4) SSM Regulation and Article 70 SSM Framework Regulation. 
34
 Case T-122/15 Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg v. ECB (pending) 
35
 See in this context Recital (28) SSM Regulation. 
36
 See e.g., Recital (29) SSM Regulation which requires the ECB to cooperate with Member State 
authorities ‘competent to ensure a high level of consumer protection and the fight against money laundering’ 
37
 E.g. I Angeloni, Towards a macro-prudential framework for the single supervisory area, (Belgium 
Financial Forum, Brussels, 20 April 2015), available at 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2015/html/se150420.en.html. 
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not aligned between Member States and systemic risk might differ between them
38
), it is 
widely acknowledged that the complexities sketched out here call inter alia for greater 
levels of coordination between actors. There are provisions to this effect in (inter alia) the 
SSM Regulation.
39
   
 
Question 16c 
In terms of ensuring meaningful input in the ECB’s decision-making processes, the issue 
is most troubling for non-Euro participating Member States. As already noted, this has to 
do with the fact that these Member States cannot be represented in the Governing Council 
of the ECB. Admittedly, the establishment of the Supervisory Board allows these 
Member States to have a voice. However, there is little doubt that all the arrangements 
that were adopted fall short of offering non-euro participating states an equal say (see 
also above).  
 
Question 16d 
See above point (a). 
 
Question 19 
The SSM Regulation was based on the view that a strict separation between monetary 
and supervisory functions is essential in order to avoid conflicts of interests between the 
two functions.
40
 The ECB in its prudential role was given distinct statutory goals.
41
 
Article 25(2) states, inter alia, that ‘[t]he ECB shall carry out the tasks conferred on it by 
this Regulation without prejudice to and separately from its tasks relating to monetary 
policy and any other tasks’. Chinese walls were put in place at an operational level.42 
Moreover, in order to ensure an effective separation, the SSM Regulation provides inter 
alia for the Governing Council to operate in a differentiated manner with respect to 
monetary and supervisory functions.
43
 As noted earlier, the Supervisory Board is 
entrusted with preparing decisions, which will be treated as adopted by the Governing 
Council following a non-objection procedure. Meanwhile, a mediation panel was set up 
in order to address divergences between the Governing Council and the Supervisory 
Board ‘with a view to ensuring separation between monetary policy and supervisory 
tasks’.44 Moreover, the ECB’s internal organisational structure has also been amended in 
order to reflect the separation principle.
45
 Its rules of procedure now also differentiate 
                                                 
38
 Cf. Opinion of the European Central Bank of 25 January 2012 on a proposal for a Directive on the access 
to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms 
and a proposal for a Regulation on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms 
(CON/2012/5) 5. 
39
 See Article 5 SSM Regulation.  
40
 See Recital (65); Recital (73); Recital (77) and especially Article 25 SSM Regulation. 
41
 Article 1 SSM Regulation. 
42
 Article 25(2) SSM Regulation. 
43
 Article 25(4) SSM Regulation.  
44
 Article 8(1) Regulation (EU) No. 673/2014 of the European Central Bank of 2 June 2014 concerning the 
establishment of a Mediation Panel and its Rules of Procedure [2014] L179/72. 
45
 Decision of the European Central Bank of 22 January 2014 amending Decision ECB/2004/2 adopting the 
Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank (ECB/2014/1) [2014] OJ L95/56. 
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between the decision-making procedure in micro-prudential matters and macro-prudential 
matters.
46
 
However, none of the above safeguards can do away with the ECB’s Treaty-based 
governance structure which centres around the Governing Council. Likewise no 
legislative text can do away with the ECB’s primary constitutional objective which is to 
maintain price stability. Like other aspects of the SSM, politically acceptable 
arrangements for safeguarding an institutional separation between monetary and 
supervisory functions were thus tightly constrained by existing Treaties. The agreed 
arrangements mostly safeguard the separation principle at the operational level,
47
 but at 
the decisional level the separation principle is less tightly secured, notwithstanding the 
existence of the Supervisory Board; a mediation panel (which cannot overrule the 
Governing Council); a statutory principle of separation enshrined in Article 25(2) sub-
para 1 of the SSM Regulation; and the obligation for the Governing Council to operate in 
a differentiated manner (including regarding meetings and agendas). The point is that 
final authority for prudential supervision will continue to rest with the Governing Council 
and hence with those that also decide monetary policy.  
Clearly the arrangements that were adopted do not therefore represent a first best solution 
as far as the separation principle is concerned. Having said that, it is also important to 
acknowledge that – notwithstanding the arguments in favour of separation between the 
monetary and prudential functions – it is not desirable that each function takes place in a 
total vacuum.  
 
Question 21 
See also earlier answers.  
As a general comment, from a UK point of view, the establishment of the SSM gives rise 
to concerns over (negative) externalities in the micro- or macro-prudential field which 
might cause the UK and especially the City of London to suffer detrimental effects. 
Whilst the reality of these concerns remains to be established, the attempt by the ECB to 
implement the CCP location policy is an example commonly cited in the UK in order to 
illustrate the potential dangers of greater integration within the Eurozone, even if the 
actions of the ECB in this area were unrelated to the SSM.  
To properly appreciate the effect of the SSM on ‘outs’ (that is, on ‘non-participating 
Member States’), EBA’s role must also be evaluated. The ECB is a ‘competent authority’ 
for the purposes of the ESFS. It will be subject to EBA’s intervention powers (such as 
dispute settlement, including in relation to supervisory colleges). In theory, EBA has 
therefore a crucial role to play between ‘ins’ and ‘outs’. That said, it remains to be seen 
whether EBA will be able to play this role effectively. EBA is a collective actor and has 
no preferences of its own: its preferences are those of its members – national authorities – 
as determined through the voting procedures laid down in EBA’s founding regulation. 
These voting procedures have been amended as a result of the establishment of the SSM 
in order to safeguard the interests of authorities from Member States which are not part of 
                                                 
46
 See Article 13(g) and Article 13(h) of the Decision of the European Central Bank of 19 February 2004 
adopting the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank (ECB/2004/2) [2004] OJ L80/33, as 
amended by Decision ECB/2014/1. 
47
 Article 25(2) sub-para 2 SSM Regulation. 
 13 
the Banking Union. As noted earlier, this may well be at the expense of the effectiveness 
of EBA.  
 
Question 21a 
The SSM Regulation does not change the allocation of powers between ‘ins’ and ‘outs’. 
These powers are based on the home-host model and are determined in accordance with 
EU law.
48
 The home-host model will thus continue to matter greatly in relationships 
between ‘ins’ and ‘outs’. As far as groups are concerned, supervisory colleges will also 
continue to matter as vehicles for cooperation between competent authorities from within 
and outside the SSM. However, what changes is the fact that within the SSM space, the 
ECB will assume functions which were previously exercised by national authorities that 
are now part of the SSM. Where it exercises direct supervisory competence (based on the 
‘significance’ criteria), the ECB will act – in its relations with national authorities of 
‘outs’ – as either the competent authority of the home Member State (in case of 
‘passporting out’) or as competent authority of the host Member State (in case of 
‘passporting in’).49 The ECB may also act as consolidating supervisor.50 Cooperation and 
coordination arrangements, as well as supervisory colleges, remain therefore crucial 
mechanisms for ensuring a smooth functioning of the supervisory framework. 
From the UK standpoint, the critical issue is thus arguably less about powers than about 
how the ECB intends to exercise these powers. It is apparent that the ECB may adopt a 
supervisory and enforcement culture that represents a marked departure from previous 
(national) approaches.  
 
Question 21b 
See point (a) above. 
 
 
C. The Single Resolution Mechanism 
 
Question 22 
The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the Single Resolution 
Mechanism Regulation (SRMR) stand at the epicentre of the EU legal framework of bank 
resolution.
51
 Under the SRMR, the Single Resolution Board (SRB) has the overall 
                                                 
48
 See Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to 
the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, 
amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC [2013] OJ 
L176/338. 
49
 See the SSM Framework Regulation for details. Note however that in relation to the free provision of 
services, in the case of ‘passporting in’, the ECB will carry out the tasks of the authority of the host 
Member State irrespective of the ‘significance’ criterion (see Article 16 of the SSM Framework 
Regulation). 
50
 See the SSM Framework Regulation for details. 
51
 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (15 May 2014) known as the Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) was published in the Official Journal of the European Union, 
L 173/190, 12 June 2014. The Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 15 July 2014 known as the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation (SRMR) was published in 
the Official Journal of the European Union, L 225/1, 30 July 2014. Both EU legal instruments were 
adopted on the basis of Article 114 of TFEU for the approximation of laws of Member States for the 
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responsibility for the effective and consistent functioning of the Single Resolution 
Mechanism (SRM).
52
  The operation of the SRM is based on a division of tasks between 
the SRB and the national resolution authorities of Member States participating in the 
Banking Union. The allocation of competences between the SRB and the national 
resolution authorities is determined in light of the systemic significance of the bank (or 
investment firm) in question according to a range of complex and open-ended SSM 
rules.
53
 The SRB has direct authority over the resolution of systemically significant 
banks.
54
 In this regard, the role of the national resolution authority is confined in assisting 
the SRB in resolution planning, in contributing to the preparation of the resolution 
decisions and in taking measures for the implementation of resolution schemes adopted 
by the SRB. Institutional dynamics change in relation to less systemic banks, namely 
banks other than those referred to in Article 7(2) of SRMR. Typically, these are small and 
medium size domestic banks. National resolution authorities remain directly responsible 
for the resolution of those banks, subject to certain exceptions as, for example, when the 
SRF is to be used.
55
 In the latter case, it is for the SRB to decide the resolution scheme 
according to the procedure of Article 18 SRMR.  
The need to resort to SSM rules to determine the allocation of competences between the 
SRB and national resolution authorities suggests that the SRM is endowed with the same 
legal problems that were identified in previous parts of this report in relation to the SSM. 
Accordingly, any observations made above apply here as well. At this juncture, it is 
worth noting that Article 7(4) SRMR adds a further layer of complexity. According to 
this provision, the SRB has the discretion to exercise directly all the relevant powers 
under the SRMR ‘[w]here necessary to ensure the consistent application of high 
resolution standards under this Regulation’. It is difficult to predict the circumstances 
under which the SRB is likely to use this discretion. The SRMR does not provide 
guidance to this effect.  Furthermore, the reference to ‘high resolution’ standards raises 
more questions than answers, as it is not clear how to distinguish ‘high’ resolution 
standards from other types of resolution standards, in the absence of a system of 
normative hierarchical order in the legal text.  
The SRB is not the sole EU level agency with an explicit bank resolution mandate. A key 
task of the European Banking Authority (EBA) is to contribute to the consistent 
application of EU law as, for example, the bank recovery and resolution requirements as 
                                                                                                                                                 
purposes of the establishment and functioning of the internal market. Financial Stability Board, FSB Key 
Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions (15 October 2014). The 2014 
publication is an updated version of the original 2011 publication, available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/2014/10/r_141015/. 
52
 Article 7(1) SRMR. Where decisions and actions bear out adverse effects on the UK as, for example, 
threats to the financial stability of the domestic financial market, the Single Resolution Board (SRB) should 
take into consideration those adverse effects. This arrangement is not necessarily reassuring for the UK. 
The SRMR does not go as far as to legally mandate the SRB to ensure the amelioration of those adverse 
effects. See Article 6(3) and Recital (54) of the Preamble to the SRMR. According to Article 42(1) of 
SRMR, the SRB is an EU agency with legal personality. It was launched on 1 January 2015 and became 
fully operational as of 1 January 2016. 
53
 See Article 7(2) SRMR. 
54
 See Article 5(1) SRMR. 
55
 See Article 7(3) SRMR. 
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these are set out in BRRD.
56
 To this effect, the EBA acts as a quasi-standard setter, 
supervisor, coordinator, mediator and enforcer according to the founding Regulation of 
the EBA (EBAR). On paper, the functions of the EBA complement those of the SRB, 
however, the co-existence of these two EU agencies is potentially troubling. Take the 
example of EU agency enforcement action.
57
 The SRMR highlights the leading role of 
the SRB in the SRM. At the same time, it preserves the role of the EBA as the guardian 
of the consistent application of EU bank resolution rules in all 28 Member States 
including those participating in the Banking Union. Experience with the EBA so far 
suggests that most probably the EBA will follow a strategy of ‘enforcement inertia’ as a 
recognition of the leadership of the SRB in the SRM.
58
 That said, it is interesting to note 
that the enforcement powers of the SRB are very limited in scope.
59
 This being the case, 
it is conceivable that certain breaches of EU law will be left untreated because they fall 
outside the enforcement remit of the SRB.
60
 To pre-empt this problem, one might be 
tempted to interpret the ambiguous legal text to the effect of recognising that the EBA 
should come to the aid of the SRB and act in its enforcement capacity in those instances 
where the SRB cannot.
61
 This approach is expedient and pragmatic but it comes with the 
cost of added legal and institutional complexity. In addition, it is controversial because it 
ignores the fact that EBA interference does not sit well with the introduction of a 
                                                 
56
 See Regulation 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) amending Decision No. 
716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Directive 2009/77/EC, 2010 OJ (L.331/12). The EBA’s role in 
recovery and resolution is enshrined in Articles 25 (‘Recovery and resolution procedures’) and 27 
(‘European System of Bank Resolution and funding arrangements’) of the BRRD. In the same spirit, 
Article 125(1) of the BRRD also brought resolution authorities with the definition of ‘competent authority’ 
of Article 4(2) EBA Regulation and thus within the remit of the EBA. None of these provisions is 
successfully drafted, however, they arguably highlight certain key aspects of the role of the EBA as an EU-
level resolution agency for matters falling beyond the outreach of the SRB.  
57
 In the SRM, it is legally mandatory for national resolution authorities to implement the decisions and 
instructions of the SRB. See Article 21(11) and 29(1) SRMR. National resolution authorities are also 
‘competent national authorities’ for the purposes of EBAR. Accordingly, they also fall under the parallel 
supervision and guidance of the EBA. See Article 125(1) BRRD. 
58
 Article 17 EBAR endows the EBA with quasi-investigatory and enforcement powers but does not go as 
far as to vest the EBA with sanctioning powers. By contrast, the SRB is empowered to impose sanctions, in 
particular, fines (Article 38 SRMR) and periodic penalties (Article 39 SRMR). 
59
  Article 29(2) SRMR. This power is significantly circumscribed. Furthermore, it is not enough to 
establish that the national resolution authority in question has failed to apply the measure or that it failed to 
apply the measure to the satisfaction of the SRB. In addition, the failure of the national resolution authority 
must be demonstrably grave enough to pose a threat to any of the resolution objectives under Article 14 
SRMR or to the efficient implementation of the resolution scheme.  Finally, the measure that is 
communicated through the decision of the SRB to the bank must be capable of addressing the threat to the 
relevant resolution objective or the threat to the relevant resolution scheme. The SRB decisions are binding 
for both the noncomplying bank and the national resolution authority and they prevail over previous 
decisions of the national resolution authority on the same matter. On this point see Article 29(3) and (4). 
For a more detailed discussion see A. Georgosouli, ‘Regulatory incentive-realignment and the EU legal 
framework of bank resolution’ (2016) 11 Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial and Commercial Law 
(forthcoming). 
60
 Especially, in relation to the resolution of small and medium sized banks, which fall outside the 
immediate authority of the SRB. 
61
 There are also pragmatic reasons that arguably militate against enforcement inertia. For a detailed 
discussion see A. Georgosouli, ‘Regulatory Incentive-realignment and the EU legal framework of bank 
resolution’ (2016) 11 Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial and Commercial Law (forthcoming). 
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streamlined decision making procedure for matters pertaining to the functioning of the 
SRM under the leadership of the SRB. Although the practical implications of this 
arrangement remain to be seen in the future, it should be noted that the inter-relation of 
the SRB (as the competent EU-level resolution agency) and the EBA (as the guardian of 
the consistent application of the substantive requirements of the Single Rulebook 
including those on bank resolution) is a source of confusion which is likely to be 
strategically exploited by resentful Member States and other stakeholders.
62
 
Alongside the SRB and the EBA, other EU institutions and agencies are also involved in 
bank resolution. Below, I consider briefly the respective roles of the European Central 
Bank (ECB), the Commission and the Council. 
The ECB is responsible for the operation of the SSM. Bank resolution is not considered 
to be part of its mandate.
63
  The ECB contributes to the recovery and resolution of 
Eurozone banks as a prudential supervisor. For example, the ECB determines the 
systemic significance of the bank in question and it takes early intervention measures to 
promote its financial stability objective. It has the power to impose requirements, to carry 
out stress tests as well as a range of other supervisory tasks in relation to recovery and 
resolution plans under certain circumstances.
64
 The ECB also determines whether a bank 
is failing or likely to fail, at the request of the SRB.
65
 The division of competences 
between the ECB and the SRB is not always clear.  For example, in the context of early 
intervention where the ex officio involvement of the ECB is most pronounced, the same 
set of events may give rise to potentially conflicting measures by the ECB as the 
prudential supervisor and the SRB as the resolution agency, where there is a failure to 
coordinate action effectively.
66
  
The Commission and the Council have a strong presence in the SRM. This should not 
come as a surprise. Only institutions of the Union are empowered to establish the 
resolution policy of the Union.
67
 In view of the margin of discretion that is essential for 
the adoption of each specific resolution scheme, it is necessary to provide for the 
adequate involvement of the Council and the Commission.  As a rule, the Commission is 
                                                 
62
 See A. Georgosouli, ‘Regulatory incentive realignment and the EU legal framework of bank resolution’ 
(2016) 11 Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial and Commercial Law (forthcoming). 
63
 Strictly speaking, the ECB is responsible for price stability through the implementation of monetary 
policy and for financial stability through macro-prudential supervision. See Article 127 (1), (2) and (6) 
TFEU. According to the prevailing interpretation of Article 127(6) TFEU, bank resolution does not fall 
within the scope of the competences that can be conferred to the ECB.  
64
 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks to the European 
Central Bank  concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (29.10 2013 
Official Journal  L287/63). Article 6(6) SSMR (setting out the supervisory responsibilities that fall within 
the exclusive competence of the ECB) in conjunction with Article 4(1)(f) and (i) SSMR. 
65
 If the ECB fails to make such a determination, the SRB retains the right to assess whether a bank is 
failing or likely to fail. The ECB power to withdraw authorisation is set out in Article 4(1)(a) SSMR. 
66
 According to Article 16(2) of SSMR, the ECB can remove members of the management board that are 
not “fit and proper”. This power overlaps with Title III (Articles 27 to 30) of the BRRD, which deals with 
early intervention in bank resolution. Specifically, Article 28 BRRD empowers the resolution authorities to 
remove senior management when the latter has failed, for example, to draw up a plan of negotiation and 
restructuring of the debt with the creditors of the bank. As long as the failure described in Article 28 of the 
BRRD can be seen as a species of failure to comply with fit and proper test, the same chain of events 
potentially activates both the powers of the ECB as prudential supervisor and the powers of the resolution 
authority. 
67
 Recital (24) of the Preamble to SRMR. 
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endowed with the task of assessing the discretionary powers of the SRB. In its turn, the 
Council is empowered to make determinations about the impact of the resolution scheme 
on the fiscal sovereignty of Member States and their financial stability. In the context of 
the SRM, the Commission performs the following key functions: (a) it participates in the 
resolution procedure of the SRB,
68
 (b) it sets out the details of the SRF,
69
 (c) it appoints 
and removes the Chair, the Vice Chair and other Members of the SRB,
70
 (d) it holds the 
SRB accountable
71
 and, last but not least, (e) it provides State Aid and Fund Aid.
72
 The 
Council complements the functions of the Commission especially in respect of the 
approval of SRB resolution schemes, according to the resolution procedure of Article 18 
SRMR, the appointment and removal of board-members of the SRB, the operation of the 
SRF. However, together with the European Parliament, the Council acquires a far more 
prominent role in keeping the SRB accountable.
73
 
In theory, the tasks of the Commission and the Council are clearly demarcated in the 
SRMR. In practice, complications are likely to arise as a result of the complexity of the 
decision-making process and the open-ended nature of the involvement of the Council. 
The procedure for the adoption of the resolution scheme when the SRF is to be used 
demonstrates this point.  
Once it is established that a troubled bank is failing or likely to fail, the SRB must inter 
alia determine whether the resolution of the bank in question is in the ‘public interest’. In 
determining whether the resolution is ‘in the public interest’, the SRB must consider 
whether it is ‘necessary’ for the attainment of the resolution objectives as these are set out 
in Article 14 SRMR and ‘proportionate’. 74  Provided that it is, the SRB adopts the 
resolution scheme. When the resolution action involves the use of the SRF, the SRB 
notifies the Commission and the Commission makes assessments about the proposed use 
of the SRF with respect to any distortions to competition, impact on trade between 
Member States and compatibility with the internal market.
75
 In making this assessment, 
the Commission applies the State Aid criteria as these are set out in Article 107 TFEU.  
Upon the conclusion of this assessment, the Commission adopts a decision on the 
compatibility of the use of the Fund with the internal market.  The use of the word ‘shall’ 
conveys that the involvement of the Commission is certain in the decision-making 
procedure for the resolution scheme. The opposite holds for the involvement of the 
Council. The use of the world ‘may’ leaves beyond doubt that the involvement of the 
Council is contingent on the discretion of the Commission and it is not to be assumed 
                                                 
68
 Article 18 SRMR. 
69
 Article 19 SRMR. 
70
 On the appointment and removal of the Board see Article 56(6) and (9) SRMR. 
71
 The SRB is accountable to the European Parliament and to the Council for any decisions taken on the 
basis of SRMR. Furthermore, the SRB is accountable to national Parliaments of participating Member 
States. For example, a national Parliament has the power to invite the Chair to participate in an exchange of 
views in relation to the resolution of institutions in that Member State together with a representative of the 
national resolution authority. According to Article 45 (accountability) SRMR, the SRB is also accountable 
to the Commission for the implementation of the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation. 
72
 Article 19 SRMR (State aid and Resolution Aid). See further Recitals (30), (57) and (75) of the Preamble 
to the SRMR. 
73
 Article 45 SRMR. 
74
 See Article 18(5) SRMR.  
75
 On the bearing of competition in the determinations of the Commission see notably Recital (9), (19) and 
(21) of the Preamble to the SRMR. 
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simply by virtue of the fact that the resolution scheme calls for the use of the SRF. In any 
case, should the Commission decide to implicate the Council, the Council is empowered 
to object, on a proposal of the Commission, to the Board’s resolution scheme only on the 
grounds specified in Article 18(7) of the SRMR. Specifically, the Council may object the 
resolution scheme either on the ground that it is not in the public interest (contrary to the 
initial determination of the SRB) or for the purposes of modifying the amount of the use 
of the SRF as proposed by the SRB.
76
 The resolution scheme enters into force only if, 
within 24 hours from its adoption, there are no objections from the Council or the 
Commission, or the resolution scheme is approved by the Commission. 
The participation of the Council is also open-ended in relation to the use of State Aid or 
Resolution Funds according to the procedure of Article 19 SRMR. In both cases the 
Commission must inter alia assess the impact on competition and the compatibility of 
State Aid or SRF with the internal market according to State Aid criteria. However, by 
way of derogation from Article 19(3) SRMR, the Council may decide that the use of the 
SRF shall be considered compatible with the internal market.
77
 The Council has the 
discretion to take this decision unanimously, on the application of a Member State and 
only in exceptional circumstances. The SRMR does not point to any criteria for the 
assessment of the circumstances as ‘exceptional’, in a similar fashion that it does, for 
example, for the purposes of guiding the determinations of the SRM as to whether a 
resolution scheme is in the public interest in the course of the resolution procedure of 
Article 18 of the SRMR. Moreover, the SRMR does not provide for a specific timeframe 
within which the Council must act. It only stipulates that the Council ‘must make its 
attitude known within seven days of the said application being made.’ This introduces 
ambiguity that is to be regretted in view of the onerous time constraints that apply to bank 
resolution and the politically charged nature of the use of State Aid or the Resolution 
Fund. 
As a final note, special reference should be made to the fact that the SRB and virtually all 
other EU-level institutions and EU-agencies are legally bound by delegated acts, 
regulatory and implementing technical standards, guidelines and recommendations of the 
EBA.
78
 The EBA lacks the institutional clout to turn against EU-level institutions (e.g. 
the ECB or the Commission) in order to ensure compliance with these rules.
79
 It also 
seems unlikely to see the EBA in the future openly contesting the judgments of the SRB 
taking into account the expertise and leadership of the SRB in the SRM and granted that 
more often than not the SRB will be acting with a strong backing from the ECB. It is to 
be expected that any matters will be resolved on the basis of Memoranda of 
Understanding and ad hoc communications in a spirit of mutual cooperation and 
coordination. This arrangement is pragmatic and flexible but not transparent enough to 
convey confidence as to the legitimacy of the decisions taken. It also raises questions as 
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 The use of the SRF is further discussed below in a separate section. 
77
 Article 19(10) SRMR. 
78
 Article 5(2) SRMR which is to be read in conjunction with Articles 10 to 15 and 16 of Regulation (EU)  
No1093/2010 (EBA Regulation) and in respect of the EBA standard setting powers within the scope of the 
BRRD. 
79
 According to Recital (54) of the Preamble to SRMR, ‘[t]he Board, the national resolution authorities and 
the competent authorities, including the ECB, should, where necessary, conclude a memorandum of 
understanding describing in general terms how they will cooperate with one another in the performance of 
their respective tasks under Union law. The memorandum should be reviewed on a regular basis.’ 
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to the robustness of the existing mechanisms of accountability and procedural due 
process opening thus a window of opportunity for the legal contestation of EU-level 
decisions by means of judicial review. 
 
Question 23 
Below, I provide an overview of certain legal and institutional aspects of the SRM which 
point to key strengths and weaknesses of this arrangement. The rules on the SRF will be 
discussed separately. 
To appreciate the perceived strengths of the SRM, it helps to keep in mind the problems 
that it seeks to address and how it fares when compared to the BRRD system of a 
coordinated network of bank resolution outside the Banking Union, as it is put into 
operation by national resolution authorities albeit under the supervision and guidance of 
the EBA.
80
 Compared to the BRRD, the SRMR establishes a quasi-supranational 
arrangement as a response to a plethora of problems including the following: (a) 
fragmentation, (b) policy diversity and, (c) negative feedback loopholes between 
sovereigns and banks. Bringing bank supervision and bank resolution to the same level is 
also expected to ameliorate tensions between EU-level and Member State level resolution 
authorities. The SRM also addresses the need for swift and decisive action. Compared to 
national resolution authorities, the SRB is endowed with a greater pool of resources and 
experience. Thus, it is thought to be better placed to handle a bank resolution more 
effectively. The SRF draws on a pool of significant resources from bank contributions 
and therefore it has greater capacity to protect taxpayers compared to the protection 
afforded by national resolution financing arrangements. At the same time, it provides a 
level playing field across participating Member States. 
This notwithstanding, there are several weaknesses in the current inception of the SRM. 
The scope of application of the SRMR is fragmented. The SRM applies to credit 
institutions as these are defined under the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) (that 
is banks and certain other deposit takers), parent undertakings including financial holding 
companies and mixed financial holding companies that are subject to consolidated 
supervision of the ECB under the SSM, and investment firms and financial institutions 
when covered by consolidated supervision of the parent undertaking under the CRR.
81
 
The resolution of insurance firms and Central Counter-parties is not covered.
82
 As it was 
pointed out above, the division of competences between the SRB and national resolution 
authorities is based on assessment of the systemic significance of the troubled financial 
institution in question. Although it is not difficult to trace the legal and political grounds 
for it, the wisdom of this arrangement is questionable. Entrusting national resolution 
authorities with the direct responsibility for the resolution of less systemic banks is liable 
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to preserve well-intended but short-sighted introversion and protectionist attitudes in the 
Banking Union.
83
 One of the grounds for a centralised system of decision-making for 
bank resolution in the Banking Union is the need to reduce the tension between EU-level 
and Member State level authorities. With the advent of the SRB and a quasi-centralised 
system of decision making, it is to be expected that the likelihood of unilateral action will 
be reduced on those occasions where the SRB replaces national resolution authorities in 
deciding crucial aspects of bank resolution. That said, the SRB relies on national 
resolution authorities in two important respects: It relies on national resolution authorities 
for the implementation of the resolution measures and for the taking of enforcement 
action at Member State level.
84
 Their cooperation is important for the effective and timely 
resolution of banks in the Banking Union but it is not to be taken for granted.  
The problem becomes worse once we take into account that the BRRD does not 
harmonise all aspects of bank resolution. Take the example of the bail-in tool. The BRRD 
defines the scope of the bail-in tool excluding secured, collateralised and guaranteed 
claims as well as certain kinds of unsecured liability – most notably deposits protected 
under the Deposit Guarantee Directive 2014/49/EC and certain liabilities of the 
employees of the failing institution. However, Member States have the discretion to 
exclude other liabilities.
85
 Furthermore, with the exception of the ranking of deposits, 
which is harmonised by virtue of article 108 BRRD, the rankings of all other claims are 
to be determined under the applicable domestic insolvency law.
86
 Consequently, 
disagreements may crop up with respect to (a) the scope of the bail-in tool, in other words 
the determination of liabilities that may be subject to the write down or conversion 
powers of the resolution authority and (b) the ranking of claims. 
Where incentives are not properly aligned at Member State and EU levels, points of 
friction are preserved and new sources of resentment are created. The mounting tension 
does not serve the objectives of the EU legal framework of bank resolution.
87
 It 
undermines cooperation, impedes information sharing, causes delays and breeds litigation 
risk. In this respect, it is to be regretted that the investigatory and enforcement powers of 
the SRB against national resolution authorities and directly against banks are very limited 
                                                 
83
 N. Veron, ‘Europe’s Radical Banking Union’ (2015) 33 Bruegel Essay and Lecture Series at 20-22, 
available at http://bruegel.org/wpcontent/uploads/imported/publications/essay_NV_CMU.pdf. 
84
 It is worth mentioning that contrary to the EBA, articles 38 and 39 SRMR endow the SRB with powers 
to directly impose sanctions on noncomplying banks under certain circumstances. These take the form of 
administrative penalties and, in particular, fines and periodic penalty fines. 
85
 According to Article 44(3) BRRD, ‘In exceptional circumstances, where the bail-in tool is applied, the 
resolution authority may exclude or partially exclude certain liabilities from the application of the write-
down or the conversion powers.’ 
86
 Article 27(3) SRMR defines the scope of the bail-in tool in a manner that is consistent with the BRRD. 
Not unlike the national resolution authorities of non-Banking Union participating member States acting 
subject to BRRD provisions, the SRB has also the discretion to exclude certain liabilities in part or as a 
whole. Article 27(5) SRMR replicates Article 44(3) BRRD. With respect to the treatment of shareholders in 
bail-in and the writing down and conversion of capital instruments including the sequence of write-down 
and conversion, the SRMR makes reference to articles 47 and 48 BRRD. With respect to the ranking of 
deposits it makes references to Article 108 of BRRD.  
87
 The resolution objectives are set out in Article 31(2) of the BRRD. 
 21 
in scope when all other informal and voluntary means of coordination and 
communication (e.g. Memoranda of Understanding) fail.
88
 
 
Question 30 
The SRF is set up under the ownership and administration of the SRB.
89
 It is financed by 
the private sector. Specifically, the banking industry is mandated to make ex ante and, 
under certain circumstances, ex post contributions. The SRB can also borrow or take 
other measures to support the funding of the SRF.
90
 The SRF is not part of the Union 
budget and it is not meant to trigger budgetary liabilities for Member States. The SRF has 
a target level of 55 billion euros.
91
 This equates to at least 1% of the amount of covered 
deposits of all banks in the Banking Union. It is to be filled over a period of eight years. 
The funds will be first raised at a national level and then they will be transferred to the 
SRF in accordance with the principles established by an Inter-Governmental Agreement 
(IGA) between participating Member States.
92
 The use of the SRF follows the same rules 
that govern the provision of national financing arrangements under the BRRD.
93
 The SRF 
can be used for a range of purposes, including providing guarantees, making loans, 
purchasing assets and providing compensation to shareholders or creditors. It can also 
provide capital to a bridge bank or asset management vehicle. By contrast, the SRF is not 
intended to provide funding for the direct absorption of losses of a failing institution or 
for direct recapitalisation.
94
 More generally, the SRF serves as a back-up option.  
As it was noted above, certain key elements relating to the functions of the SRF are 
regulated by an Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA). The IGA covers (a) the transfer of 
contributions raised at Member State level by the national resolution authorities, (b) the 
progressive mutualisation of the funds available in the national compartments (c) the 
replenishment of national compartments, (d) the order in which financial resources are 
mobilised to cover resolution costs and (e) possible participation to the SRF of non-euro 
area Member States.  All participating Member States signed the IGA on 21 May 2014. 
The IGA will enter into force once it is ratified by the national Parliaments of the 
participating Member States.
95
 
The provision of the SRF is certainly a move in the right direction. Its actual potential is 
yet to be tested, however, even at this early stage there are some issues of concern. It is 
not certain that the target level will actually be enough to provide medium term support 
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in the future.
96
 The eight-year period of transition is also a long period of time, during 
which the SRB will have to operate relying on national resolution funds. There is also a 
time mismatch between the development of the SRF and the establishment of an EU level 
Deposit Insurance Scheme as the third pillar of the Banking Union. As I explain in a 
separate section below, progress has been slow in this respect with a lot of crucial details 
to be decided in the future. Although the SRF is not part of the Union budget the 
distinction between financing arrangements that affect the Union budget and those that do 
not touch on Union budget is elusive and a constant source of legal uncertainty absent a 
Fiscal Union to back up and complement the operation of the SRF. 
 
D. The Single Rulebook 
 
Question 33 
The Single Rulebook is the epitome of maximum harmonisation and the principal means 
to attain substantive legal uniformity in the single market for financial services. 
Maximum harmonisation has led to a proliferation of multi-tiered EU legislation.  Part of 
this growing volume of legislation is technical, detailed and directly applicable to 
Member States including the UK. At the same time it is subject to review. This on-going 
review aims to ensure that EU legislation is always up to date but it comes at a price. It 
undermines the durability of the legal text. This is not a trivial matter. Quite apart from 
increasing the cost of compliance as the industry must always be vigilant of the latest 
changes in the legislation, the temporary nature of regulatory requirements erodes any 
sense of legal certainty and predictability.  Seeing things from the angle of the UK and 
irrespective of the substantive merits of the legislation in question, the current form of the 
Single Rulebook is concerning. For instance, the direct applicability of technical 
requirements is perceived as a serious threat to the discretion of the UK (through the 
Bank of England and the PRA) especially on matters of crisis prevention and 
management.  It also raises issues of legitimacy to the extent that it can be argued that 
that EU-level institutions and agencies force Member States to bear risks that nationally 
accountable regulators consider to be excessive.
97
  
The case for maximum harmonisation is premised inter alia on the assumption that 
regulatory competition (or at least some degree of it) is not desirable because it preserves 
diversity and may lead to a race to the bottom. There is no logical necessity why this 
should be the case at all times. Regulatory competition may bear out the opposite result. 
It may also be justified on the grounds that it allows breathing space to think outside the 
box as national regulators do not have to decide and act within the strict normative 
confines of EU legislation. Moreover, it makes room for flexibility so that national 
regulators are able to tailor their responses to the peculiar circumstances that apply to the 
jurisdictions where they operate.  
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The Single Rulebook is wedded to the idea of maximum harmonisation because the 
presence of a heterogeneous regulatory environment is thought to complicate 
significantly cross-border supervision and regulation. However, the Single Rulebook 
itself is a source of legal complexity. To all intents and purposes, it has not reduced 
complexity. At best, it has replaced one source of complexity (diverse regulatory 
environment) with another (convoluted and notoriously technical legal requirements).  
Assuming that there is a case to be made in favour of substantive legal uniformity in the 
single market for financial services, one might also question whether the Single Rulebook 
is ‘single enough’. 98  Substantive legal uniformity calls for an EU-level system of 
centralised regulation. Although progress has been made in this direction, the present 
institutional arrangement is not supra-national. It exhibits a range of inter-
governmentalist features the purpose of which is to leave ample room to Member State 
level regulators to exercise domestic options, directions and practices.
99
 
 
Question 35 
The Deposit Guarantee Directive provides minimum harmonisation requirements for 
depositor protection in the EU and it is currently under review.
100
 The Directive does not 
introduce a centralised system of deposit insurance in the EU. There are benefits to be 
gained out of a centralised framework for the administration of deposit guarantee 
schemes in the Banking Union. A centralised administration allows for quick decisions 
and greater policy convergence. It reduces fragmentation and competitive distortions 
across the Single Market. It is also instrumental to the alignment of the use of resolution 
funds in the course of a bank resolution and the use of funds specifically for the purposes 
of depositor protection.
101
  
Despite its perceived benefits, the actual potential of a centralised administration for 
deposit guarantee schemes in the Banking Union should not be blown out of proportion. 
A fundamental issue in the completion of the Banking Union is the link between banks 
and sovereigns. As long as this link is preserved, the location of the bank will continue to 
be the key factor for the determination of the riskiness of bank deposits. Moreover, 
funding costs for national Deposit Guarantee Schemes will continue to vary across 
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Eurozone countries. A conclusion to be drawn out of these preliminary observations is 
that the completion of the Banking Union is not undermined by the lack of a centralised 
administration of deposit insurance as much as by the lack of a scheme for the 
mutualisation of the bank risks associated with depositor protection in the Banking 
Union.  
Generally speaking there are two options for the funding of deposit guarantee schemes in 
the Banking Union: The provision of a credit line to various national DGSs or the 
mutualisation of risks of losses on depositors across borders.
102
  The provision of an EU-
level credit line to national DGSs (either directly or indirectly) would be useful but, for 
all intents and purposes it would still preserve the link between banks and sovereigns.  By 
contrast, the mutualisation of risks of losses on depositors across borders by way of a 
European Deposit Insurance Scheme seems to be a more credible solution. A third and 
arguably more pragmatic option in view of the present institutional set up is the provision 
of a European re-insurance scheme whereby national insurance schemes are asked to pay 
risk-premia.
103
  
As of 24
th
 November 2015, the Commission proposed as an Euro-wide deposit insurance 
scheme (EDIS) the creation of a Single Resolution and Deposit Insurance Board within 
the SRB for the administration of EDIS and the progressive establishment of a European 
Deposit Insurance Fund. National DGSs would remain in place and they would be part of 
EDIS. EDIS is to be funded by the banking industry by way of ex ante contributions and 
it is to be established in three sequential stages: During the first stage there will be a re-
insurance stage (until 2020). During the second stage there will be a co-insurance scheme 
(until 2024) and, in the final stage, EDIS would fully insure deposits and would cover all 
liquidity needs and losses in the event of a pay-out or resolution procedure. 
 
 
E. Banking Union in Context 
 
Question 39 
The establishment of the Banking Union does not change the Court’s Treaty-based role. 
However, it is undeniable that the establishment of the Banking Union will further 
increase the Court’s workload. For instance, given the ECB’s new role under the SSM 
and its powers to take supervisory measures vis-à-vis supervised entities, the Court will 
see an entirely new line of cases emerging regarding the legality of the ECB’s decisions. 
This will arguably not be without challenge: not only because of the additional workload, 
but also because the ECB is empowered to apply national law transposing directives, 
including national law giving effect to options granted to a Member State under EU law. 
Moreover, it should be recalled that the Banking Union is an example of differentiated 
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integration: it does not extend to the EU as a whole. The Court will therefore also be the 
final arbiter of disputes between ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ on matters relating, for instance, to 
disruptions to the internal market.  
 
 
